Effective to solve small and medium-sized enterprise financing the cost
Credit guarantee system set up after, small and medium-sized enterprise financing cost is the bank of loan interest plus a certain amount of handling fee, far less than the cost of raising money from the folk, and to reduce the financing cost of small and medium-sized enterprises.
Can reduce the cost of management and business bank risk
The existence of the credit guarantee agencies for small and medium-sized enterprises can simplify the bank loan program, reduce the management cost. And because the credit guarantee institutions able to deal effectively with the bank solvency crisis, reduce the Banks' bad loans, so can stimulate the bank to open up new credit business.
Credit guarantee system has the function of the economic lever
And general enterprises and institutions of the professional guarantee compare, due to overcome the spontaneity, scattered shortcomings, such as sex, credit guarantee system, with the system can be studied the specific target, according to their own strength and credibility for many times the assets of the security liability, so this kind of credit guarantee has the function of magnification, in social resource allocation process, can play economic leverage, become the government regulation of the development of small and medium-sized enterprises effectively
Editor this period of credit guarantee defects
From the political economics level, the Chinese small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee system currently in structure, operation and function existence triple defects. Structural defects is to point to the financial guarantee in ZF dominant position, type of business folk capital guarantee and mutual aid guarantee the share is very low. Business defects is mainly embodied in the lack of four aspects, namely fund compensation mechanism and diversification mechanism, the guarantee and guarantee the lack of talent varieties. Functional defects and structural defects and profit-making has close relation??????? Structural defect in the sense of the macro functional defects, business defects is a the microscopic sense of functional defects.
Structural weaknesses
Small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee system structural defects mainly displays in: in institutions and guarantee the loan amount on the number, ZF guarantee high share, folk capital type guarantee (including mutual guarantee and commercial guarantee) the proportion of the severely limited. By the end of 2003 to the end of June, the national credit guarantee agencies for 966 home, folk capital type guarantee agencies about 35.2%. In 2001 about $10 billion in total guarantee amount, ZF guarantee fund for 6.6 billion yuan. This shows that the financial contribution of the whole system in ZF guarantee is in a dominant position. In the system of market economy, the government is as a macro DiaoKongZhe and social management and existence and operation, in the market supervision function is to market, market rules formulated and maintaining market order. And, small and medium-sized enterprise loan gap as a phenomenon of the market, the market itself have mechanism, reasons and the ability to solve it, that is, by private capital in middle and small enterprise loan market for loan guarantees. Due to the small and medium-sized enterprises more than quantity wide, loan demand has obvious individuation, metabolism faster, so impossible to finish in ZF macro regulation and social management function and after sufficient financial guarantee system in middle and small enterprise plays a leading role. So, small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee system heavily reliant on ZF guarantee, no need or impossible.
Business defects
Small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee system of management defect mainly reflects in four aspects the lack of financial compensation mechanism and diversification mechanism, guarantee varieties and guarantee the lack of talent. In addition, many through the policy invests the establishment ZF guarantee agencies did not implement operation of enterprise management and marketization, administrative intervention are still outstanding. Some local government according to the "who investment, who decision" market principles, think ZF in voting on security project, so leaders decided to project the story is not rare. Some local leaders to use this kind of ZF for small and medium-sized enterprises credit guarantee for "set rent" or "rent-seeking", or put to small and medium enterprises ZF credit guarantee this long-term behavior and politicized lot. 1. The lack of money compensation mechanism ZF guarantee agencies funds to local government at all levels of financial capital and assets into give priority to, DanBaoFei income as auxiliary. But local fiscal funds and assets into most are one-off, scale and small. ZF guarantee agencies to profit as the main target not, DanBaoFei charge is low. Commercial guarantee agencies is less capital strength, the same lack of money compensation mechanism. Most commercial guarantee agencies as the cash for the high DanBaoFei source, part of the same period of guarantee agencies bank loan interest rates by half DanBaoFei charge, some institutions of higher DanBaoFei than this. International in most countries DanBaoFei general at around 1%, France is 0.6%, our country TW area and Hong Kong SAR is only about 0.5%. 2. Lack of diversification mechanism because the lack of clear system standard, guarantee agencies and because too small and negotiations in the strength of weak position, so most Banks will be small and medium-sized enterprise loan risk shifting to the guarantee agencies, there are a lot of guarantee agencies or even 100% of the forced to assume the credit risk. International, guarantee agencies generally assume only 80% of the loan responsibility, in the United States for 80%, Canada for 85%, France, for 50%, Japan is 50 to 80%, Germany for 50-80%. Guarantee agencies not only focused on the loan risk too much, and they are lack of diversification mechanism. Most of the guarantee agencies, especially business guarantee agencies, are seeking a counter-guaranty terms to spread risk, or to improve security charge the transfer of risk. 3. A serious lack of guarantee of professional personnel of the capital contribution in some local government guarantee agencies is often by not familiar with guarantee business as ZF officials, but ZF guarantee agencies but only in the operation and management of experts under a market-oriented and operation of enterprise can realize break-even or profit-making business, to not to profit as the ultimate goal of the policy objective. Folk capital type guarantee agencies at present business is one of the reasons for the lack of slow and professional management and operations. Meanwhile, China is still no guarantee qualification access system and disciplinary systems also caused the existing from personnel of the lack of ability and quality. 4. Poor guarantee varieties, the period focused on short-term China most guaranteed loans deadline in less than six months, the longest do not exceed one year. Guarantee breed basically limited to liquidity, few equipment, technical transformation and long-term loan. International, most countries are to small and medium-sized enterprises is the long-term bank loans to provide security, so guarantee period is longer, be in commonly 2 years. The longest is the United States, the guarantee period for 17 years. Guarantee breed is very rich also, including venture loans, bills discounting, science and technology development loan, equipment loans and technical transformation of loans, etc.
Functional defects
Structural weaknesses of functional defects bring embodied in the macroscopic level. In the past, China's large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises can directly use of the country because the credit and bank loans this exogenous financing evolved into endogenous financing. Along with our country market economy system establishment and development, China has gradually corrected the mistake phenomenon, the large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises and assets of the loan financing credit hooks. If now and put too much credit in ZF in small and medium-sized enterprise, equivalent to go to the other extreme. This will allow state-owned enterprises with excessive use of national credit, cause financial burden ZF, ZF amplification risk, market risk management function decline. ZF guarantee of small and medium-sized enterprises, the more loans, which means ZF dial out of the more financial capital, ZF burden, and also means that the more of the credit ZF spending, for the small and medium-sized enterprises and the more loan risk. At the same time, the market itself has the excellence of spreading risk management and function, and small and medium-sized enterprise loan risk was market phenomenon, ZF guarantee dominance of the show for ZF might have been too much by market management and dispersed risk, must cause the market management and dispersive risk function weakening. The existing business system defects restricted the guaranteed loan market demand, adding to a loan guarantee moral risk and adverse selection, which affect the existing credit guarantee system performance and sustainable development. Too much ZF guarantee will induce the opportunism behavior of the small and medium-sized enterprises, increase the moral risk, easy for the small and medium-sized enterprise add to the dependence of ZF. Especially in China many enterprise constraint mechanism has not really form, this problem is more easy to produce.
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